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The International Intellectual Property System
and Developing Countries Before and
After the TRIPs Agreement: A Critical Approach
Tshimanga Kongolo
Abstract
This Article examines也e dilemma facing developing countries in也e course of imple-
meriting也e so-called international norms embodied in the TRIPs Agreement, with par-
ticular emphasis on patent issues. India, Brazil and Mexico patent systems are evaluated.
This study arrives at the conclusion也at without appropriate national policies, develop一
mg countries will be at仇e losing end. We recommend developing countries to streng血en
their anti-monopoly and competition laws, adopt appropriate measures to safeguard也e
consumers interests, consider a new approach to public interest, introduce the utility mod・
els regime, and adopt worldwide exhaustion as regards patents, wi也Iocal working as an
exception.
Keywords: developing country, intellectual property, TRIPs Agreeme鴫India, Brazil, Mex-
1CO.
This is a brief summary of our Ph.D. Thesis written under the supervision of Professor Junichi Eguchi
and to whom we are very indebted. We have intentionally omitted parts of this thesis that are already
published elsewhere.
Research Associate, Osaka School of International Public Policy, Osaka University.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In the last two decades, intellectual property protection has gained more atten-
tion within the international framework. The necessity to harmonize different na-
tional laws pertaining to the protection of intellectual property rights of member
countries of international organizations, has been acknowledged. Under this per-
spective, WIPO played an important role in the past. In order to achieve its objec-
tives, WIPO has considered the interests of both developed and developing coun-
tries.
However, it should be noted that the difference between these interests has given
rise to a struggle over the level of protection of intellectual property rights. The
struggle between the two camps is not new. Developing countries allege that they
do not find any merit in providing strong protection of intellectual property rights
that are created, in most cases, in developed countries. Furthermore, they argue
that the protection of intellectual property entails expenses that they cannot afford
due to their economic situation. Meanwhile, it is undeniably true that developing
countries - importers of technology - need investment and technology to develop
their industries, and thus to better the welLbeing of their nationals. It should be
noted that most developing countries encounter problems in implementing interna-
tional requirements at the national level. That makes them question the positive
impacts of the alleged protection of intellectual property in worldwide perspective
because the protection of intellectual property rights does not bring positive
changes in their economies.
Developed countries seek more protection of intellectual property rights univer-
sally without reference to the level of development. In other words, for developed
countries, it is utmost that intellectual property rights are protected in the same
manner in both developing and developed countries. Thus, they argue that it is im-
perative to provide international standards of protection of intellectual property.
Furthermore, developed countries　-　exporters of technology　-　argue that the so-
called transfer of technology must be carried out in a safe environment where in-
tellectual property rights are enforced.
The failure of the WIPO to bridge the gap of interests between the two camps,
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and to assure the revision of its conventions , prompted developed countries to
adopt another strategy. Developed countries, as a policy, decided to link trade with
intellectual property and brought the related matters under the umbrella of GATT.
At the outset of discussions, most developing countries were against such insertion.
They alleged that WIPO was better qualified to deal with issues pertaining to the
protection of intellectual property rights. The threat of sanctions and the fear of
isolation obliged developing countries to accept such a shift. Finally, developing
countries concluded the Convention Establishing　也e World Trade Organization
(hereinafter WTO). By adopting the Convention Establishing the WTO, all mem-
bers (developed and developing countries) are obliged to comply particularly with
its requirements which are embodied in the Agreement on Trade Related-Aspects
of Intellectual Property Rights called the "TRIPs Agreement." The implementation
of the TRIPs Agreement at the national level, particularly wi血regards to devel-
oping countries, has various implications. Will developing countries benefit eco-
nomically from strengthening their protection of intellectual property? This ques-
tion has not yet found an adequate answer. Their economic levels do not enable
them to cope with the two realities: strong protection of intellectual property
rights and development needs.
We must confess that it is not an easy task to deal with issues pertaining to the
protection of intellectual property rights in developing countries. The global per・
ception of the matters cannot be reached without having a general picture of the
way intellectual property rights are protected within the international framework.
Under this perspective, and because of the correlation between the TRIPs Agree-
ment and the pre-existing instruments of protection of intellectual property, we
analyze, in a theoretical approach, the main provisions of the Paris Convention for
the Protection of Industrial Property and the issues stemming from the protection
of intellectual property in developing countries before examining the innovations of
the TRIPs Agreement in the field of patents. Furthermore, we will highlight, in a
comparative approach, the patent protection systems existing in selected developing
countries: India, Brazil and Mexico. We will mainly compare the existing patent
systems of those countries with the TRIPs Agreement, with particular reference to
conflicting issues. Finally, the implications of the TRIPs Agreement for developing
l) There are several conventions administered by the WIPO.
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countries are examined. Under this perspective, we will attempt to answer to the
following key questions:
1. Does the TRIPs Agreement Facilitate　仇e Transfer of Technology between
Developed and Developing Countries?
2. Is the TRIPs Agreement Overprotective, Coercive and Outdated?
3. How Should Developing Countries Escape from Strong Patent Protection Pro-
vided under the TRIPs Agreement?
This study aims at highlighting difficulties developing countries would encounter
while implementing血e TRIPs Agreement. Moreover, this article endeavors to rec-
ommend developing countries to adopt some policies that would enable them to
counterbalance (overcome) the required strong patent protection.
II. The Pre-Existing International Instruments of Protection of Intellectual Property
(WIPO System)
Due to the complexity of the notion "developing countries", under the present
study, any country member recognized as such within the framework of the UN
customary practice, will be deemed to be a developing country. We recommend
readers to refer to specialized literature on the subject
Prior to the establishment of the World Trade Organization (WTO), the mterna-
tional institution directed to deal only with the protection of intellectual property
wi也in the international framework was the World Intellectual Property Orgamza-
tion (hereinafter WIPO)S). WIPO administers several conventions relating to the
protection of intellectual property rights. Under也is study, we will mainly deal
with the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property by focusing on
2) Several schools of thought attempted to define development. The author recommends readers to refer
to the works of the following scholars:
*WALT W. ROSTOW, THE STAGES of ECONOMIC GROWTH, CAMBRIDGE, CAMBRIDGE UNI
VERSITY PRESS, 1960.
*Robert Solow, A Contribution to the Theory of Economic Growth, 70 QUARTERLY JOURNAL of
ECONOMICS (1956). See also Technical Change and Aggregate Production Function, 39 REVIEW
of ECONOMICS and STATISTICS 1957.
詛Robert Lucas, On也e Mechanics of Economic Development, 22 JOURNAL of MONETARY EGO-
NOMICS 1988.
*SAMIR AMIN, UNEQUAL DEVELOPMENT: AN ESSAY ON THE SOCIAL FORMATIONS OF
PERIPHERAL CAPITALISM, NEW YORK, MONTHLY REVIEW PRESS, 1976.
3) The objectives of the WIPO are as follows:
(i) to promote the protection of intellectual property throughout the world through cooperation
among States and, where appropriate, in collaboration with any other international organization;
(ii) to ensure administrative cooperation among the intellectual property Unions, that is,也e "Unions"
created by the Paris and Berne Conventions and several sub-treaties concluded by members of the
Paris Union.
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patent issues.
1. Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property
The Paris Convention was signed in Paris on March 20, 1883 and became effec-
tive in 1884. It has been amended several times4'. The Paris Convention has the
merit to provide rules to be respected in the field of industrial property within the
international framework. It has played a significant role in the course of harmo-
nizing national industrial property laws of its members. The Paris Convention has
been considered as a "Model" of legislation in the field of industrial property for
most developing and developed countries parties to the Union. This Convention
also gives member States the authority to deliberately decide their policies accord-
ing to their levels of development and their priorities.
Paris Convention has set general provisions to be respected and implemented by
all member countries in their respective national laws: principle of national treat-
merit5', principle of priority6'and the principle of independence7
In the field of patents, the Paris Convention has provided rules that members
should implement at the domestic level. What should be mentioned is that the
Paris Convention has given its signatories a certain amount of leeway to determine
the scope of protectable matters8', the exclusive rights to confer to the patentee9',
4) Paris Convention has been revised at Brussels on December 14, 1900, at Washington on June 2, 1911, at
the Hague on November 6, 1925, at London on June 2, 1934, at Lisbon on October 31, 1958, and at
Stockholm on July 14, 1967.
5) According to Article 2 0f the Paris Convention, as regards the protection of industrial property, nation-
als of one of the countries of the Union shall enjoy in the territory of other member countries仇e
same treatment as well as advantages accorded to their nationals.
6) Paris Convention has prescribed periods in which priority would be granted to any person if apphca-
tions have been filed for patent, or for the registration of a utility model, or a trademark, or of an in-
dustrial design in one of the countries of the Union. Those periods of priority are fixed for twelve
months as to patents and utility models, and six months for trademarks from the filing date of the
first application.
7) Article 4 bis prescribes as follows:
(1) Patents applied for in the various countries of the Union by nationals of countries of the Union
shall be independent of patents obtained for the same invention in other countries, whether members of
the Union or not.
(2) The foregoing provision is to be understood in an unrestricted sense, in particular, in the sense
that patents applied for during the period of priority are independent, both as regards the grounds for
nullity and forfeiture, and as regards their normal duration.
Paris Convention has left to the discretion of each member to determine the scope of protection of pat-
ent rights. Generally speaking, patent is granted for "inventions" that fulfill some conditions set by
each member country.
9) Despite the lack of explicit provisions dealing with rights and obligations of the patentee or right
holder, under the laws of a large number of member countries of the Pans Convention, exclusive
rights are granted. The patentee is the "monarch" of his property. He has血e monopoly rights to ex-
ploit his property. A misuse of the owner's rights constitutes an infringement.
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也e conditions for granting compulsory licenselO'including facts which may be con-
sidered to be the "working or non-working" of patentl", and the period of protec-
tion12). It should be pointed out仇at the Paris Convention does not contain provi-
sions relating to the enforcement of patent rights. The Paris Convention contains
only very few provisions which are binding upon the substantive law of the mem-
ber countries. Any member country may shape its domestic patent law to suit its
respective needs and interests13'.
The UN requested for the revision of the Paris Convention to take into account
claims of developing countries.
2. Specific Issues Raised in the Course of Intellectual Property Protection
in Developing Countries
There are many studies and discussions regarding the protection of intellectual
property rights m developing countries. There are in general three approaches: the
case for strong intellectual property rights protection, the case against strong inteト
Iectual property rights protection, and the alternative attitude.
Under the UNCTAD and WIPO, the essential points discussed since 1974 involve
the scope of protection of patents, the exclusivity of rights conferred, the compuL
sory licensing, the period of protection and the enforcement of intellectual property
rights.
A. Scope of Protection of Intellectual Property Rights
With respect to patents, developing countries opposed the enlargement of the
scope of patent -　to include for example the pharmaceutical products　-　on the
grounds that it is a matter of public policy for each individual country14'. In addi-
10) When an invention has not been worked or exploited by the patentee or the right holder in a required
period, any interested party may request for the grant of compulsory license. In the same sense, a
compulsory license might be granted to a third party in the hypothesis where a patentee abuses the
exclusive rights conferred by the patent. It should be mentioned that a grant of a compulsory license
may not be applied before the expiration of a period of four years from the date of filing of the pat-
ent application or three years from the date of the grant of the patent.
11) Most member countries prescribe period within which the patentee or the right holder must exploit or
work his patent (invention).
12) Under the Paris Convention, no term of patent protection has been provided. Member countries have a
certain amount of leeway to determine the period of protection of the patentee's exclusive rights. De-
veloping countries have advocated a shorter protection period.
See M.HIANCE　&　Y.PLASSERAUD, BREVETS ET SOUS-DEVELOPPEMENT: LA PROTECTION
DES INVENTIONS DANS LE TIERS-MONDE (1972).
13) Hans Peter Kunz-Hallstein, Patent Protection, Transfer of Technology and Developing Countries ‥ A
survey of the Present Situation, 6 IIC, 4, 1975, at 442.
14) Kastenmeier & Beier, Intellectual Trade and Intellectual Property: Promise, Risks, and Reality, 22
VAND. J. Of TRANS. L., 1989, at 295.
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tion, those countries opposed the expansion of the scope of patentability as it
would have negative implications15'for the economy of developing countries, since
it would favor large scale companies from developed countries and lead to the mo-
nopolization of industries.
During也e debate over the Draft of the Patent Law Treaty, developing countries
argued that in respect of fields of technology eligible for patent, there should be a
degree of flexibility that allow countries to exclude certain types of technology
from their respective patent system. They added that血ose exclusions had a very
substantial importance in the improvement of people's welfare, the e血ancement of
industrial development and other aspects in their national development. In addition,
they believed that, in that regard, moral and ethical principles that were generally
accepted should have been taken into consideration16)
Developed countries advocated, during the debate on the Draft of Patent Law
Treaty, strong protection of patent and supported血e trend to provide patent pro-
tection in all fields of technology for bo血products and processes17)
In summary, the broader the scope of protection of intellectual property rights, the
more developing countries are burdened to protect them.
B. Exclusivity of Rights Conferred
Developing countries see the exclusive rights conferred to the owner of the intel-
lectual property rights as excessive18)
As Oddi has noted, the exclusive right granted to a foreign patentee favors an
import monopoly on the patented invention19'. Considering the need of developing
countries in the course of their development, it seems important to recognize and
to provide exceptions to the exclusive rights.
In respect of product patents, developing countries were firmly convinced也at
those basic rights should only consist of the making, selling and using of the pat-I　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　!
15) The relatively strong protection of intellectual property rights, in particular as regards inventions, has
not led to a high rate of patent registrations in African countries, nor has it stimulated technology
transfer into these countries.
See Yusuf A.A. (1995), Intellectual Property Protection in the Countries of Africa, INT. J. TECHNOL
OGY MANAGEMENT, Special Issue on the Management of International Intellectual Property, Vol. 10,
2/3, pp. 269-292.
16) Records of the Diplomatic Conference for the Conclusion of a Treaty Supplementing the Paris Conven-
tion as far as Patents are Concerned, WIPO, 1991.
17 Id.
18) See Foyer, Problemes Internationaux Contemporains des Brevets d'Inventions, in 171 DE L'ACADEMIE
de DROIT INTERNATIONAL, Recueuil des Cours 340, 378-402 (1981).
19) Samuel Oddi, The International Patent System and Third World Development: Reality or Myth?, DUKE
LAW JOURNAL, 1987, 831-877.
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ented product, while whether or not the patent confers a right of importation
should be left to the national laws. As regards process pate鴫they believed that
the fundamental rights conferred to the patent holder was to prevent unauthorized
use of patented process. They should not extend the protection to products directly
obtained from the process because it could allow extension of protection to unpat-
entable subject matter, or extend the term of product patent that should have
lapsed201.
Developed countries asserted that the right holder should be able to control the
commercialization of the patented products, which included the act of putting the
product on也e market and, therefore, comprised the act of importation. A right to
prevent acts in respect of products directly obtained from a patented process was
essential to ban仇e distribution of products that had been obtained by infringing
the patented process.21)
C. Compulsory Licensing
Developing countries favored the expanded use of compulsory licenses. However,
developed countries opposed such view. Indeed, according to developed countries,
an invention, for instance, is a fruit of a lengthy research process. A patent shall
be considered as a reward to an inventor. The recognition of compulsory licensing
goes against this spirit.
Developing countries instead, have considered the regime of compulsory license
as a limitation to the excessive exclusive rights granted to the owner of the intel-
lectual property. This is especially salient in the case where the owner of patent
or the right holder does not accord any license or does not exploit or work lo-
cally his invention. A "non-use" of intellectual property rights during a certain pe-
nod of time may be considered to be reasonable grounds for granting compulsory
licensing.
20)supra note16.
21)supra note16.
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D. Period of Protection
There were several discussions as to the duration of intellectual property rights
protection in developing countries. The period of protection is more in line with
the exclusive rights accorded to the owner or right holder of intellectual property.
The longer the term of protection is, the longer exclusive rights granted to the
owner or the right holder last. In this context, developing countries advocated
shorter period of protection of intellectual property rights in general and patent
rights in particular.
Previous to the adoption of the TRIPs Agreement, a large number of developing
countries provided patent protection for a period of 7 to 20 years.
In the opposite camp, developed countries argued for a much longer protection of
patent rights.
E. Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights
Developed countries urged developing countries to enforce more effectively their
Laws and Regulations relating to intellectual property. According to developed
countries, insufficient protection of intellectual property rights may lead to an in-
crease of piracy or counterfeit goods.
Developing countries, however, asserted that an effective enforcement of intellec_
tual property rights brings about no benefits and is instead costly22'.
III. Patent Protection under the TRIPs Agreement (WTO System)
After several discussions and debates undertaken under the auspices of the
GATT23) (uruguay Round), in April 199424), the Convention Establishing the WTOl l l
22) Regarding costs and benefits of intellectual property to developing countries, Deardorff has stated也e
following:
First, taking the perspective of the world as a whole, if the costs of extending intellectual property
protection exceed the benefits, then extending it is inefficient and should be rejected from a world wel-
fare point of view. Second, when the incidence of these costs and benefits is not uniform, with the
costs instead being borne disproportionately by one group in society and the benefits largely accruing
to another, then the distributional implications of extending intellectual property protection should also
be considered.
See Allan V. Deardorff, Should Patent Protection Be Extended to All Developing Countries?, 13
WORLD ECONOMY, 4, 1990, at 500.
23) Asif H. Qureshi, The Role of GATT in the Management of Trade Blocs, 27 JOURNAL OF WORLD
TRADE, 3, June 1993.
24) See Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, April
15, 1994　Marrakech).
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was adopted.
As mentioned above, the WTO through the TRIPs Agreement has obliged deveL
oped and developing countries that are members to meet its requirements in the
field of intellectual property in general and patents in particular. It is meaningful
before highlighting the innovations of the TRIPs Agreement in the field of patent
to address the issue pertaining to the relation between the pre-existing system and
the actual system.
1. Relation between the Paris Convention and the TRIPs Agreement
According to Article 2 (1) of the TRIPs Agreement, members shall comply with
Articles 1-12 and 19 0f the Paris Convention (1967). In other words, every member
country of the WTO is obliged to implement at the domestic level Articles 1-12
and 19 0f the Paris Convention (1967), being member signatory or not of也e Pans
Convention. The simple fact of adhering to the WTO implies the respect of the
above-mentioned provisions of the Paris Convention. Under也is approach, unless
otherwise stipulated, the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property
is an integral part of the TRIPs Agreement.
Despite this apparent inclusion of the pre-existing system into the new system of
protection of intellectual property, it should be pointed out, however, that the
TRIPs Agreement has in most cases strengthened the protection or extended the
scope of protection by including new items within the patent protection sphere. In
addition, most provisions of the TRIPs Agreement bind every member country of
the WTO. In the sense that most provisions are mandatory and do not give
enough space to countries to design their national laws in accordance with their
needs and priorities. There is no other alternative than complying with the TRIPs
Agreement. Matters which were left under the discretional authority of every
member of the Paris Convention have been, under the TRIPs Agreement, strength-
ened.
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2. Innovations of the TRIPs Agreement in the Field of Patents
In the area of patents25', the TRIPs Agreement provides rules regarding the pat-
entable subject matter, rights conferred, conditions on patent applicants, the com-
pulsory license, the term of protection and the enforcement of rights. In the pre-
sent study, attention will be drawn to the innovations of the TRIPs.
TRIPs provides three conditions for the patentability of inventions. The mven-
tion shall be new, involve an inventive step and be capable of industrial applica-
tion. In addition, the TRIPs Agreement has extended the scope of the availability
for patent to inventions in all fields of technology, and regardless of the place of
invention and whether products are imported or locally produced (Article　27(1)).
TRIPs recommends countries to make patent protection available for pharmaceuti-
cal (products and processes) and agriculture chemical products26'. TRIPs likewise
provides items to be considered unpatentable (Article 27 (2-3)).
The TRIPs Agreement, while providing for the exclusivity of rights of the pat-
entee, has at the same time acknowledged some limits or exceptions to these
rights (Article 30). As regards compulsory licenses, TRIPs sets conditions that each
member shall comply with while granting a compulsory license to a third party27'.
TRIPs considers the importation of patented products to be the "working of pat-
ents". According to developing countries, this provision would favor the import
monopoly instead of inducing multinational companies or technology producers to
work locally their inventions in developing countries. This provision may have
some negative implications for the so-called transfer of technology between devel-
25) According to Martin Adelman and Sonia Baldia, a universal patent system will, on the whole, benefit
the world community by eliminating the free-riders'disincentives to innovate in all market structures
and by increasing仙e supply of needed inventions that would otherwise not have been made.
See Martin Adelman　&　Sonia Baldia, Prospects and Limits of the Patent Provision in the TRIPs
Agreement: The Case of India, 29 VAND. J. of TRANS. L., (1996) at 507.
See Tshimanga Kongolo, Prospective Reform in Zairian Patent Law After the Enforcement of the
TRIPs Agreement, 1 INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC POLICY STUDIES (March 1997) at 147-160.
26　TRIPs Agreement, Article 70 (8).
Under Article 70 (9) the TRIPs Agreement provides that where a product is the subject of a patent ap-
plication in a member in accordance with paragraph 8 (i), exclusive marketing rights shall be granted,
for a period of five years after obtaining market approval in that member or until a product patent is
granted or rejected in that member, whichever period is shorter, provided that, subsequent to the entry
into force of the Agreement Establishing the WTO, a patent application has been filed and a patent
granted for that product in another member and marketing approval obtained in such other member.
27) TRIPs has narrowed the scope of applicability of compulsory licenses. See Article 31 0f the TRIPs
Agreement.
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oped and developing countries.
Under the TRIPs Agreement, the term of protection of patent is set at a mini-
mum of 20 years from the filing date of application (Art. 33).
It should be pointed out that the TRIPs Agreement requires member countries of
the WTO to provide enforcement rules and procedures under their national laws
(Article　41). These rules shall be fair and equitable and shall not constitute
grounds to the creation of barriers to legitimate trade and members shall also
safeguard measures against their abuse.
IV. Comparative Analysis of Patent Systems of Developing Countries
This section intends to scrutinize the patent systems elaborated in developing
countries, namely India28', Brazil29'and Mexico30'by putting more emphasis on the
conflicting issues with reference to the TRIPs Agreement31)
The inescapable conclusion which emerges from the analyses of intellectual prop-
erty rights protection in developing countries is that despite their different levels
of development, in the sense that some are considered to be LDCs and some oth-
ers developing countries, it must be acknowledged that there are fundamental simi-
larities between them. In actual fact, it would be more accurate to say that most
developing countries encounter difficulties in the course of implementing mterna-
tional rules pertaining to intellectual property.
Most of them until recently, excluded from patentability some areas of technol-
ogy, such as pharmaceuticals and agro-chemicals. India32'excludes from patentabiト
ity pharmaceutical products, agro-chemical products and foods33'. Under the Patent
(Amendment) Ordinance, 1994, the protection has been extended to products or sub-
stances themselves34'. However, this amendment has not come into force. Brazil,
-　　　　　　　　　　　　　_　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　一　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　-　　　　　　-
28) The basic law governing patents in India is the Patents Act, 1970. It has been amended in 1994 but the
revised version is not in force since the parliament has not adopted yet the amended Act, so-called the
Patents (Amendment) Ordinance, 1994.
29) The Brazilian new Industrial Property Act was enacted on May 14, 1996 replacing the Law no 5.772, of
December 21, 1971 (Brazilian Industrial Property Code). It entered into force on May 14, 1997.
30) The Mexican Law of 1991 Law was amended in 1994.
31) For more details, see our Ph.D. Thesis: The International Intellectual Property System and Developing
Countries Before and After The TRIPs Agreement: A Critical Approach, Osaka University, March 1998.
32) Most of data were collected during our research in India (April 1997).
33) Elizabeth Henderson, TRIPs and the Third World: The Example of Pharmaceutical Patents in India, ll
E.I.P.R. (1997) at 659.
34) Tshimanga Kongolo, Indo to TRIPs Kyotei ni kansuru Tokkyo Hogo Hanii oyobi Tokkyo Hatsumei
no Jisshi, HATSUMEI, Vol. 95, n. 5, 1998, at 44.
See also Isao Noishiki, Tokkyo no Zaisankenteki Honshitsu wo Ronzu, 15 KANSAI DAIGAKU
HOGAKU KENKYUSHO (1997) at 38.
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before the enactment of the new law, did not grant protection to inventions relat-
ing to pharmaceuticals, agro-chemical products and foods. In Mexico, prior to the
enactment of the 1991 Law, patents were not available as regards inventions per-
taining to pharmaceutical and agro-chemical products.
The enlargement of the scope of patent to cover any invention in all fields of
technology has several implications in developing countries. In addition, developing
countries have been left no choice but to comply with the TRIPs Agreement, espe-
cially as regards the scope of protection of patent. As the realities existing in
these developing countries have not been taken into consideration, the negative
outcome is obvious. As mentioned above, the reason for excluding these areas is
that they relate to the health of people and they are matters of public policy of
each country, and shall be left out of the purview of patents.
Another issue relates to the compulsory license and the non-working locally of
patented inventions in the countries where patents are protected. This is a big is-
sue. As often stated, there will be no meaning to grant a patent if it is not
worked domestically m the concerned country. India, Brazil and Mexico have pro-
visions relating to the granting of compulsory license for non-working of the pat-
ented inventions. It should be noted that the Indian Patent Law, in addition, pro-
vides for the automatic "licenses of right" in the food, pharmaceutical and chemi-
cal sectors with regard to the patented processes from the date of expiration of
three years from the date of sealing of the patents. However, Mexico, under its
1994 Industrial Property Law, compulsory licenses for non-working of patented in-
ventions have been largely restricted to exceptional circumstances.
All of them require the patentee or the right holder to exploit the patented in-
vention domestically, otherwise, a third party may be allowed through the compul-
sory license to use the patentee's exclusive rights. Generally, the importation of
patented products is not deemed to be the working of patent. Despite this general
principle, Brazil and Mexico have provided for some exceptions. In the case of
Brazil, for economic reasons, the importation of patented products may be consid-
ered as the working of patent35'. Mexico, under the 1994 amendment, considers
that the importation of patented products constitutes an exploitation of patent.
The working of patent is connected with the so-called transfer of technology.. If
foreign companies were not obliged to work the patented inventions, the patent
35) In the case the patentee does not get any economic profit (benefit) from the exploitation of his patent
in Brazil.
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system would fail to attain one of its aims which is to promote technology pro-
gress of recipient countries.
Let us look at the number of patent applications filed in India, Brazil and Mex-
1CO.
Tablel
Table Showing the Number of Applications for Patenかfrom Persons in India and
Abroad Year-wise from 1989-90 to 1993-94.
1989-90　　1990-91　　1991-92　　1992-93　　1993-94
Indians 1,039　　　1,180　　　1,293　　　1,228　　　1,266
Foreigners
resident in India
Foreigners　　　　　　　2,621　　2,583　　　2,259　　　2,239　　　2,603
residemt abroad
Total　　　　　　　　　　　3,661　　　3,764　　　3,552　　　3,467　　　3,869_....--
Source: Indian Patents Rゆort (twenty second annual γゆort) , 1993-94.
The number of applications for patents received from Indian nationals and for-
eigners during the years 1989-90 to 1993-94 is shown in these tables. As it could be
noticed,也e number of applications for patents filed by foreigners is every year
higher than the number of applications filed by Indian nationals. This demonstrates
that applicants who seek the grant of patents are in majority foreigners.
(Table2)
According to the table, for the year 1991, the number of applications filed for m
vention patents was 2350 for residents and 10302 for non-residents. However, the
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number decreased during the consecutive four years for non-residents. The number
dropped from 10302 in 1991 to 3392 in 1995. We should mention that during five
years (1991-1995),也e number of applications filed by non-residents was higher
compared with也e number of applications filed by residents in Brazil. This illus-
trates that more invention patents in Brazilian are granted to non-residents or for-
eign companies.
Notwithstanding the overwhelming number of applications filed by foreigners as
regards invention patents, in the area of utility models for small inventions, the
number of applications emanating from residents was outstandingly large respec-
tively during the years 1991-1995. The number shows the importance attached to
utility models in developing countries in general and in Brazil in particular as re-
gards small inventions which may not be protected under the patents for inven-
tions.
(Table3
Aj坤hcations for Paten缶and Utility Mode缶in the Years 1991-1995 in Mexico
1991　　　1992　　　　1993　　　　1994　　　　1995
Nationals　　　626　　　　　565　　　　　553　　　　　498　　　　　432
Patents Fore如ers　　4727　　　　7130　　　7659　　　9446　　　4802
Total　　　　5353　　　　7695　　　　8212　　　　9944　　　　5232
Nationaね　　　40　　　　169　　　　　261　　　　325　　　　　352
Ut的Models Fore如ers　　　　　　　　　34　　　　　81　　　　94　　　　　61
Total　　　　49　　　　　203　　　　　342　　　　　419　　　　　413
Source: IMP! Rゆort, 19汐6.
It is obvious through the present table that the number of applications for pat-
ents filed by nationals is decreasing since the enactment of the Industrial Property
Law in 1991. While the number of applications filed by foreigners largely increased
since 1991 before decreasing in 1995. The number of applications filed by foreigners
attained its highest level in 1994 which coincide with the entry into force of the
Industrial Property Amendment Law and NAFTA. We could expect the same
trend in 1995 ; however, the number shows a different outcome. What should be
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alsonoticedisthatfrom1991to1995thenumberofapplicationsfiledbyforeign-
ershasbeenhighercomparedwi血theonefiledbynationals.
Concerningutilitymodels,仏eresultisquitepromising,inthesense血atfrom
theintroductionofutilitymodelregimein1991bythelawmentionedbeyond,the
numberofapplicationsfiledbynationalsislargelyhigherthantheoneemanating
fromforeigners.Theintroductionoftheutilitymodelmaybethecauseofde-
creasinginnumberofapplicationsfiledforpatentsbynationalsbetween1991and
1995.
Alongwiththeabove,itisessentialtounderstandfromthesurveysthatmore
applicationsforpatentsarefiledbyforeigners.Consequently,morepatentsare
grantedtoforeigners.Thepatentmaybeusedforimport-monopolypurposesin
caseitisnotworkedlocally.India,BrazilandMexicoarenotexceptions.
Throughthesurveys,itcanbesaidthattheregimeofutilitymodelsismore
appropriatetodevelopingcountriesbecauseitencouragessmallinventions.Its
adoptionbyalldevelopingcountriescanbesuggested36'.BrazilandMexicopro-
videprotectionforutilitymodels.UnlikePatents,themajorityofutilitymodels
areappliedandgrantedtonationals.
Theregimeofutilitymodelisnotnew.InsomedevelopedcountriessuchasJa-
pan,也eutilitymodelhelpedenterprisestoaccessnewtechnologyandtoimprove
smallinventionswhichcontributedtothedevelopmentofthecountry.Theexam-
pieofJapan37'caninspiredevelopingcountriestoadopttheutilitymodelregime
inordertofavorsmallinventions38'Thesmallandmedium-sizedfirmswould
benefitfromtheadoptionoftheregimeofutilitymodelbecauseitcreatesincen-
tivetoundertakeinventiveactivitieswithoutimposingbigburden.Severalstudies
confirmthisfinding39)
Thetermofprotectionofpatentsvariesfromonecountrytoanother.Indiapro一
票ithedurationofpatentsfor5yearsfromthedateofthe
ieutilitymodelregimeisprovidedundertheParisConventionforthePr。霊ofpatentor7
。fIndustrialPr。p-
erty.TheTRIPsAgreementhasnotmentioneditunderitsprovisions.
37)JapanwasthefirstcountryafterGermanytointroduceaUtilityModelAct(1909).
SeeChristopherHeath,ContinuityandDevelopmentinJapaneseIntellectualPropertyRights,26IIC
1995at909.
38)SeeKobashiKaoru,Jitsuyoshinan-HoKaiseinoEikyo,16NIHONKOGYOSHOYUKENGAKKAI
NENPO(1991at154.
seealsoKumagaiKenichi,Jitsuyoshinan-SeidonoMinaoshiniTsuite,16NIHONKOGYO
SHOYUKENGAKKAINENPO(1991)at143.
39)Inthelightofwhathasbeenarguedearlier,itshouldbeclearthatthesystemofutilitymodelasre-
gardssmallinventionsfitswelltotheneedofdevelopingcountries.Itwasdemonstratedthrough也e
studyofsomedevelopingcountrieswhichhaveadoptedthisregimethat,unlikepatent,thenumberof
applicationsfiledbyresidentsasregardsutilitymodelwashigherthan也enumberofapplicationsfiled
bynon-residents.
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years from the filing date of application as regards drugs and foods (processes).
Regarding other patents, the term of protection has been set at 14 years from the
date of patent. Under the Brazilian Law,血e term of protection has been extended
from 15 to 20 years from the date of filing of application for patent. The same
thing can be said in respect of Mexico which has extended也e term of protection
of patents from 14 (from the granting date) to 20 years from the filing date of ap-
plication.
In summary, developing countries encounter tremendous difficulties in implement-
mg the TRIPs Agreement. The necessity for these countries to adapt the so-called
international rules to fit their national interests is required.
V. Implications of the TRIPs Agreement for Developing Countries
As stated above, TRIPs Agreement requires member countries of the WTO to
respect its prescriptions without any consideration to the level of development40)
In other words, developing countries which we have dealt wi血shall comply with
the requirements of the TRIPs Agreement41'. Prior to the enactment of the TRIPs
Agreement, most developing countries excluded from the ambit of patent protec-
tion some areas of technology. However, TRIPs recommends members to avail
patent for inventions in all fields of technology.
Under the present study, we attempt to give answers to the following key ques-
tions:
1. Does the TRIPs Agreement Facilitate the Transfer of Technology between De-
veloped and Developing Countries?
2. Is the TRIPs Agreement Overprotective, Coercive and Outdated?
3. How Should Developing Countries Escape from Strong Patent Protection Pro-
vided under the TRIPs?
■■t■-
40) Michael Rom, Some Early Reflections on the Uruguay Round Agreement as Seen from the Viewpoint
of Developing Countries, JOURNAL of WORLD TRADE, 1994.
41) Harold C. Wegner, TRIPs Boomerang-‥Obligations for Domestic Reform, 29 VAND. J. of TRANS. L.,
534-558 1996).
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1. Does the TRIPs Agreement FaciHtate the T「ansfe「 of Technology be-
tween Developed and Developing Countries?
The issue entails evaluating whether the system of protection embodied into the
TRIPs Agreement facilitates the transfer of technology between developed and de-
veloping countries.
It is needless to mention也at the so-called transfer of technology between devel-
oped and developing countries can be carried out through different means, such as
technical assistance, direct investment, joint-venture, and license agreement.
However, TRIPs, under its rules, does not create any incentive for the patentee
to license his technology. As mentioned above,血e patentee can directly supply the
market in a developing country without licensing his technology. Under the TRIPs
Agreement, the importation of patented products in the country where a patent is
protected is deemed to be也e "working" of patent. In principle, countries are not
allowed anymore to grant compulsory licenses to third parties on the ground that
patents have not been worked locally when the patented products are imported in
the concerned country by the patentee or the right holder.
Almeida P.R. points out that an exclusive focus on the monopolistic rights of
the patent owner, wi也out any concern for his obligations, would be particularly
detrimental to the developmental efforts of the developing countries and would
only widen the gap between industrialized and developing countries'42)
Stumpf maintains that the role of patents in technology transfer cannot be over-
estimated43'.
Analyzing the impact of TRIPs on the so-called transfer of technology, Verma
argues that the TRIPs Agreement, by conferring specific power to import on the
patentee and equating importation with working of the patent, has further reduced
chances of working the patent locally and deprived the granting country of all
chances for having access to patented technology'44)
what we should do is to go beyond conventional measures to see who benefits.
Referring to也　provisions of the TRIPs Agreement, the position of developing
■■■tll▼l■■■llFl-i=i岩iiiiiiiiiiiii岩iiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiillllllllttt
42) De Almeida Paulo R., The Political Economy of Intellectual Property Protection二 Technological Protec-
tionism and Transfer of Revenues among Nations, 10 INT. J. TECHNOLOGY MANAGEMENT (1995)
at221.
43) Herbert Stumpf, Interests and Conflicts of Interest in Technology Transfer - The Role of Patents, 9
IIC, n0 4, (1978) at 315.
S.K. Verma, TRIPs - Development and transfer of Technology, 27 IIC, no 3, 1996, at 355.
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countries regarding the transfer of technology has worsened because their ec0-
nomic level has not been considered. TRIPs Agreement has put more accent on
血e rights of technology holders rather than technology users.
2. Is the TRIPs Agreement Overprotective, Coercive and Outdated?
A large number of scholars distrust the notoriety of the TRIPs Agreement. The
TRIPs Agreement is the transposition of the industrialized countries'national laws
to the international framework. As previously mentioned, developed countries, espe-
daily the US, put pressure on developing countries to acknowledge the insertion of
the TRIPs within the ambit of the GATT/WTO and to elevate the protection of
intellectual property rights at its highest level.
Under WIPO framework, member countries were left free to determine也e ap-
propnate system to protect intellectual property rights. Developing countries could
design their laws in accordance with their developmental needs. They could adopt
adequate rules and policy to implement international recommendations embodied in
the WIPO and its conventions. Unlike the pre-existing instruments of protection of
intellectual property, TRIPs recommends its members (developed and developing
countries) to comply with its requirements without considering the priorities and
levels of development. On the other hand, developing countries do not consider the
protection of intellectual property as a matter of the utmost importance.
As mentioned above, in some respect, the minimum standards of protection pre-
scribed under the TRIPs Agreement are more in conformity with the industrialized
countries vision. The fact that the TRIPs Agreement safeguards the sole interest
of developed countries, it renders its implementation uncertain in developing coun-
tries.
Imposition of foreign legal standards on unwilling states in the name of "har-
monization" constitutes a polite form of economic imperialism45
45) See Reichman‥ Intellectual Property in International Trade: Opportunities and Risks of a GATT Con-
nection, 22 VAND. J. of TRANS.し(1989), at 813.
See also LADAS, PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND RELATED RIGHTS: NATIONAL AN INTER-
NATIONAL PROTECTION (1975); Ullrich, GATT: Intellectual Property Protection, Fair Trade and
Development, in GATT or WIPO (1989).
Harmonization of law involves a search for uniform solutions; in certain areas it may be simply unde-
sirable or impracticable from a country's national point of view, since仙e concession to achieve agree-
ment may not be worth it.
Ullrich states that the balance of minimum rights and national treatment is entirely altered if national
treatment is sought not for minimum, but for high level protection with a view to obtaining industrial
property control over both the domestic market of exporting countries and也e import market of third
countries.
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The TRIPs Agreement by extending the scope of protection of intellectual prop-
erty in general and patent in particular, has likely engendered further issues. The
point to be made here is that in the pharmaceutical and chemical fields, the exten-
sion of protection to products is not welcomed in developing countries m the sense
that it would be utilized as a tool to control, in case of monopoly, the flow of
drugs wi血out consideration to也e social dimension. In addition, under the TRIPs
Agreemnt, rights conferred in respect of patents for processes must extend to the
products directly obtained by the process46'. Under this approach, it could be aL
Ieged, from the view point of developing countries, that TRIPs is overprotective.
A number of scholars maintain that也e TRIPs Agreement is already outdated
because it is not able to give answers to the existing issues stemming from the
protection of intellectual property rights. The resulting tensions can only be less-
ened也rough good faith negotiation and cooperation between states, in the manner
that takes into account the interests of developed countries without prejudicing the
interests of developing countries47. In this connection, Rom has pointed out that it
is important that more flexibility should be introduced in the system to enable
weak, developing countries to cope with their problems48'. Reichman argues that
mature intellectual property systems produce harmful results when transposed to
the developing country milieu without proper adjustments for local needs and con-
ditions49).
Claudio Frischtak50) has advocated in his study the differentiated regimes in the
course of protection of intellectual property rights instead of harmonized regimes.
He has alleged that differences in individual country characteristics, stage of devel-
opment and budgetary constraints make differentiated regimes superior from a do-
mestic welfare perspective151)
In conclusion, the TRIPs Agreement is a product of coercion, pressure from de-
veloped countries rather than a result of consensus between developed and develop-
ing countries.
_　　　_　　_　　-　　　　　　　　　-　　　　　-I
46) E. Opoku Awuku, How Do the Results of the Uruguay Round Affect the North-South Trade, JOUR-
NAL of WORLD TRADE, 1994, at 84.
47) See Reichman, supra note 45, at 814.
48) Michael Rom, supra note 40, at 30.
49) Reichman, supra note 45, at 867.
50) Claudio R. Frischtak, Harmonization versus Differentiation in International Property Rights Regimes,
10 INT. J. TECHNOLOGY MANAGEMENT, 1995, at 203.
51) Id.,at201.
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3. How Should Deve一oping Countries Escape from Strong Patent P「otec-
tion Provided under the TRIPs?
As stated above, developing countries must adopt effective and adequate strate-
gies to overcome strong protection of intellectual property as provided under the
TRIPs Agreement. Developing countries expect to acquire technology and invest-
ment that would lead to the welfare of people.
Ringo argues that sovereign rights need to be respected, especially the recogm-
tion of the need for the economic, social and technological development of all
countries to ensure balance between也ese needs and the rights granted to intellec-
tual property rights holders-ensuring proper and effective diffusion of technology to
meet them52'.
Braga has emphasized that for a Third World country a reform designed to in-
crease intellectual property rights protection will tend to generate a welfare loss
at its initial stages. Because LDCs are typically net importers of technology, a
usual consequence of a more strict regime of intellectual property laws would be
an increase in royalty payments to foreigners5
How can developing countries escape from strong protection of intellectual prop-
erty rights? Developing countries should recourse to three means to escape from
strong protection of intellectual property rights:
-　Strengthening of Anti-Monopoly and Competition Laws
-　Adoption of Measures that Safeguard Consumers'Interests
-　Adoption of New Approach to Public Interest
Developing countries must strengthen their anti-monopoly laws and competition
laws. The anti-monopoly laws should be able to find out the line of demarcation
between the protection of intellectual property rights and anti-competitive prac-
tices54). Each developing country must determine acts that cross the borderline be-
tween the intellectual property law and anti-monopoly law or competition law55'. It
should be clearly stipulated under these laws that the abuse of monopoly right of
52) Frederick Ringo, The Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights in the GATT and Legal
Implications for Sub-Saharan Africa, J.W.T., 1995, at 128.
53) C.A. Primo Braga, The Economics of Property Rights and the GATT: A View from the South, 22
VAND. J. Of TRANS. L., 1989, at 256,
54) For more discussion, see Matsushita Mitsuo, Dokusenkinshi-Ho no Shiko, 13　KEIZAI-HO-GAKKAI
NENPO (1992　at 18-19.
Yamabe Toshifumi, Dokusenkinshi-Ho Ichinen no Ugoki, 15 KEIZAI-HO-GAKKAI NENPO (1994) at 146
-154.
55) See MURAKAMI MASAHIRO, DOKUSENKINSHI-HO, 1st Edition, KOBUNDO (1996) at 21.
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any intellectual property right violates the anti-monopoly law. Each developing
country should adopt competition laws in conformity with its needs and priority.
The developing countries competition laws should be against power, exploitation,
and exclusion of the weak by the powerful56'. These laws should be non-
discriminatory and transparent to enable any person who suffered from the abuse
of intellectual property to recourse to.
In the field of intellectual property, the protection of consumers' rights is in
close relation with different rules relating to competition laws that prevent the
owner of intellectual property from abusing his exclusive rights. In this connection,
in order to safeguard the interests of consumers, developing countries should effec-
tively enforce their consumer laws. In the same line of reasoning, government must
assist consumers if the protection of intellectual property rights entails negative
implications to their situation. For example, in the pharmaceutical area, the gov-
ernment can intervene by adopting measures aiming to control the price of phar-
maceutical products. The anti-monopoly laws, competition laws and consumer-
related legislation pursue the same objective, that is, to protect the interests of
consumers and maintain fair competition among competitors.
The problem of reconciling the public interest (national interest) at the domestic
level with the nature of the international recommendations has become of mcreas-
ing importance. The resolution of this basic dilemma between domestic norms and
international rules is essential to the future viability of the international system of
protection of intellectual property rights.
Each developing country must effectively implement rules that would favor na-
tional gain. In other words, as a policy, rules embodied into the TRIPs that are in
conformity with the interests of a concerned developing country should be fully
implemented at the national level. Developing countries should let public interest
prevail whenever there is a conflict between international recommendations and
national needs and priorities.
56) Eleanor M. Fox, Trade, Competition, and Intellectual Property- TRIPs and its Antitrust Counterparts,
29 VAND. J. of TRANS. L. (1996) at 499.
See Aaditya Mattoo & Arvind Subramanian, Multinational Rules on Competition Policy- A Possible
Way Forward, 31 JWT (1997) at 95-114.
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vI. Conclusion and Recommendations
This study has attempted to scrutinize difficulties developing countries encounter
while implementing the TRIPs Agreement in the area of patent. It has been noted
that the pre-existing system of protection of patent embodied in the Paris Conven-
tion somehow took into consideration the interest of developing countries by giving
them the authority to design their laws in accordance with也eir priorities. Not-
withstanding that the previous system is not without flaws, it has been proved
throughout the findings of this article that the TRIPs Agreement has worsened the
situation of developing countries by providing rules that hamper a smoo血transfer
of technology between developed and developing countries. The TRIPs Agreement
has neglected to take into account claims of developing countries addressed under
the auspices of the UNCTAD and WIPO. In this connection, the TRIPs does not
create incentive for multinational companies to invest in developing countries or
locally work their inventions in those countries.
To respond to the expectation of developing countries in the area of intellectual
property, TRIPs should adopt concrete measures to foster the cooperation between
developed and developing countries. Furthermore, in the areas of technology that
require more expenditure, the assistance and cooperation of developed countries
are needed'57)
The compliance with the TRIPs Agreement is not a priority for most developing
countries. The most important thing is the system that can finally lead to也e well
-being of people. Under this perspective, developing countries should adjust their
laws to meet their needs. In this regard, developing countries should let the public
interest (national interest) prevail while protecting intellectual property in general
and patent in particular. In the same line of reasoning, developing countries should
adopt measures that safeguard the interest of consumers. In addition, they must
strengthen or adopt new anti-monopoly and competition laws adapted to their re-
alities.
Developing countries must adopt the utility model regime for small inventions.
57) See PETER NANYENYA, TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, PRAEGER
PUBLISHERS 1980　at 70-72.
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The utility model regime to be adopted must permit rapid and simple registration.
Each concerned developing country should provide the extent to which the utility
model law applies. In the same line, the subject matter should be determined in or-
der to avoid仇e confusion between patent and utility model. The applicant should
prove the practicability of the invention to be eligible for protection.
Sharing the idea of Oddi58', we recommend developing countries to adopt a
worldwide exhaustion59'doctrine as regards patents with some limitations in the
case of local working60'. An exception to this worldwide exhaustion rule may be
considered in the case the patented invention is worked locally. If the invention
satisfies the working requirements, the worldwide exhaustion should not be applied.
Hence, the domestic patent owner or licensee could exclude patented products
originating from other countries as an incentive for local working.61)
In conclusion, the TRIPs Agreement does not meet the expectation of developing
countries regarding也e protection of intellectual property rights within the interna-
tional framework. It is time to re血ink the whole international system of protec-
tion of intellectual property. Developing countries would not protect the rights of
owners of intellectual property if the protection is harmful to local producers or
local inventors. The protection of intellectual property should not become a barrier
to free trade.
The setting up of the new system of protection of intellectual property requires
the contribution not only from developed countries but also from developing coun-
tries.
In sum, because of technological differences between developing and developed
countries (including differing levels of interest), the artificial uniformization of
norms and standards for intellectual property rights protection, renders the TRIPs
Agreement unrealistic and maトadapted to也e coming 21st century.
58) A. Samuel Oddi TRIPs-Natural Rights and "a Polite Form of Economic Imperialism", 29 VAND. J. of
TRANS. L., 1996, at 466-467.
59) See Eguchi Junichi &　Chaen Shigeki, Kokusai Torihiki to Chitekizaisan, in Genzai Kokusai Torihihi-
Ho Koza (Matsuoka Hiroshi) Horitsu Bunka-Sha (1996) at 190.
See also Shibuya Tatsuki, BBS Arumihoiru Jiken Saikosai Hanketsu, 1119 JURISTO (1997) at 96.
60) Under血e worldwide exhaustion doctrine, any patented product sold with direct or
indirect authorization of the patentee or the right holder may be imported into the country without re-
gard to whe也er也at particular product is patented in that country.
61) The worldwide exhaustion would enable developing countries to tackle not only the issue relating to
the working of patented invention domestically but it would also favor competition among competitors.
Consumers would have more choices. In this connection, the import-monopoly would be reduced. We
believe that patentees or right holders would prefer working their patented inventions locally than fac-
ing competition from uncontrolled and unknown competitors. Each developing country must take appro-
priate measures to implement this principle in accordance with its policy.
